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ABSTRACT 
 
Researchers identify two types of organizational governance: unilateral governance and bilateral governance. 
Although interfirm governance is at the core of interfirm relationships, little research exists on mechanisms that 
strengthen the weak spots in the dynamics of interfirm governance and multiple governance structures. This study 
introduces the concept of interfirm benevolence, and attempts to enhance our understanding of the conditions under 
which buyers rely on interfirm governance. The results indicate that the interfirm governance practices of a buyer 
tend to produce higher levels of supplier performance when a supplier trusts in the benevolence of the buyer. Also, 
this study shows that when a benevolent buyer uses both unilateral and bilateral governance simultaneously, 
suppliers perform positively.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
hen it comes to inter-organizational relationships, researchers have identified several types of 
interfirm governance, including monitoring (Celly & Frazier, 1996; Lal, 1990), vertical control 
(Bello & Gilliland, 1997; Heide & John, 1988), relational norms (Heide & John 1992), contracts 
(Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000), and pre-qualification (Stump & Heide, 1996). These mechanisms of 
governance have been found to effectively impact the behavior and performance of exchange partners (Coleman, 
1990). 
 
Interfirm governance, however, is known to have some key weak spots, (Young, Sapienza and Baumer, 2003; 
Ghoshal & Moran, 1996) including the existence of a sense of autonomy among cooperating parties (Ghoshal & 
Moran, 1996), and a lack of understanding among parties involved in exchange transactions (Young, Sapienza and 
Baumer, 2003). Despite the advanced understanding of interfirm governance that previous research has provided, 
there are several gaps in the literature that must be addressed.  
 
First, even though interfirm governance is at the core of interfirm relationships, little existing research explores 
mechanisms to reduce the weaknesses of interfirm governance. Because interfirm governance plays an important 
role in inter-organizational relationships (e.g., Heide, 1994), the development of mechanisms to protect parties 
involved in exchange transactions is a key task for the effective management of interfirm relationships. Thus, the 
identification of mechanisms by which exchange parties are able to reduce weaknesses in the dynamics of their 
partnership is needed. 
 
Second, even though some research has been conducted on the simultaneous use of multiple governance structures, 
including on the effects of multiple governance on interfirm performance (Jap & Ganesan, 2000), complementation 
relationships between governances (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000), and interdependence relationships 
between governances (Stump & Heide, 1996), little is known regarding the best circumstances under which the 
simultaneous use of multiple governance structures produces positive interfirm performance. 
W 
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Third, previous research on multiple governance does not investigate conditions under which multiple governance 
produces high levels of performance, with the exception of the work of Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach (2000). 
When exchange transactions are affected by uncertainty and relationship-specific adaptation, companies that rely on 
multiple governance increase interfirm performance levels (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000). However, no 
research exists on the best conditions under which exchange parties are able to improve performance by relying on 
multiple governance. 
 
This study introduces the concept of interfirm benevolence, a dimension of trust, to contribute to the existing 
literature. Benevolence, defined as the unilateral belief of an exchange party in the concern of its partners for the 
party’s well-being (Kwaku & Li, 2002), has emerged as a central tenet in the existing literature about inter-
organization relationships (Wilson, 1995). Interfirm benevolence allows exchange parties to accept and yield to the 
control of partners for the sake of producing long-term benefits via the partner relationships. 
 
The purpose of this study is to enhance our understanding of the conditions under which buyers rely on interfirm 
governance. The study accomplishes this in two ways. First, the study investigates two type of governance that may 
improve interfirm performance, including unilateral and bilateral governance. We propose that any buyer relying on 
interfirm governance tends to produce high performance levels when suppliers trust in the benevolence of the buyer. 
Second, this study examines optimal conditions for multiple governance. We argue that a buyer can effectively use 
both unilateral and bilateral governance when suppliers trust the benevolence of the buyer. 
 
The next section discusses the theoretical background of trust and governance in the context of exchange 
relationships. Research hypotheses are developed thereafter. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Interfirm Benevolence 
  
Benevolence refers to the unilateral belief of a supplier in the concern of the buyer for the well-being of the supplier 
(Kwaku & Li, 2002). The abstractions of interfirm trust present ample opportunities for the betrayal of a dyadic 
partner (Lim, Smith, and Kim, 2014; Granovetter, 1982). Indeed, the greater the trusting partner’s level of 
benevolence is, the greater potential gain there is to be had from cheating on the benevolent partner (Jun, Kabadayi 
and Ryu, 2014). Accordingly, a party’s trust in the benevolence of its partner causes the party to be far more 
vulnerable than a party that lacks trust in a partner’s benevolence. 
 
A supplier needs to calculate how much it can trust a buyer, because a supplier’s trust in the benevolence of a buyer 
exposes the vulnerability of the supplier to the buyer (Hur et al., 2014; Madhavan & Grover, 1998). A supplier 
estimates a buyer’s benevolence, resulting in the supplier’s belief in this benevolence (Doney & Cannon, 1997). 
Thus the supplier’s trust in a buyer’s benevolence is positively associated with the supplier’s expectations that the 
buyer has benevolent intentions (Moorman et al., 1992). A supplier’s trust in buyer benevolence is also related to an 
estimation of low probability that the buyer will display deceptive behavior.  
 
Types of Interfirm Governance 
 
Researchers identify two types of organizational governance: unilateral governance and bilateral governance (Weitz 
& Jap, 1995; Heide, 1994; Ouchi, 1979). The distinction between unilateral and bilateral control is based on whether 
both buyers and suppliers participate in making decisions (Weitz & Jap, 1995). Unilateral governance relies on the 
unilateral decision making of just one party, while bilateral governance is based on mutual participation in decision-
making by both parties in an exchange relationship.  
 
Bradach and Eccles (1989) defined control as an exchange facilitator, asserting that trust facilitates exchange-based 
relationships. Accordingly, the authors treat trust as a control mechanism. However, the mechanism of control is 
intended to change an exchange partner’s behavior. Trust itself is a unilateral belief in the benevolence of a partner, 
and consequently, this unilateral belief will not control behaviors among exchange partners (Das & Teng, 1998). 
Accordingly, this study does not treat trust as a mechanism of control. 
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This study adopts two types of governance, including monitoring and the norm of flexibility. Because monitoring 
involves unilateral behavior, such as the observation of an exchange partner, monitoring represents a unilateral 
control mechanism. In contrast, the norm of flexibility is an implicit rule for the mutual benefit of both parties. Thus 
the norm of flexibility represents bilateral governance.  
 
Unilateral governance is based on the efforts of a more powerful party to impact the behavior of its partner (Celly & 
Frazier, 1996; Coleman, 1990). Unilateral governance involves the use of external measurement, such as measuring 
a partner’s performance or monitoring the actions of the partner (Heide, 1994). 
 
The constant monitoring of a party over a partner provides the party with information for detecting opportunistic 
behaviors of the partner (Williamson, 1985). For instance, a buyer’s monitoring of a supplier involves review of the 
supplier’s performance or evaluation of the supplier’s inventory levels and delivery performance. Thus, monitoring 
discourages suppliers from behaving opportunistically (Stump & Heide, 1996), thereby protecting buyers from 
exploitation or unexpected low performance levels on the part of suppliers. 
 
Parties in exchange relationships tend to feel uncertainty when they do not monitor the performance of their partners 
(Anderson, 1985). A lack of monitoring causes information deficiency, because exchange parties cannot assess the 
performance of transaction partners (Kim, Sung, and Jung, 2015; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). In fact, exchange 
partners may behave opportunistically to take advantage of the information asymmetry.  
 
Given that monitoring is the unilateral surveillance of a partner, one drawback is that monitoring may offend the 
partner’s sense of autonomy (Ouchi, 1979). Monitoring signals a lack of confidence in an exchange partner. The 
constant monitoring of a partner might therefore provoke negative reactions from the partner (Ghoshal & Moran, 
1996). Although monitoring is an effective way to ensure that an exchange partner behaves in a certain way, it may 
create negative feelings for the party being watched (Green, 2000). Thus, monitoring may result in negative 
outcomes due to the lack of cooperation between buyer and supplier (Williamson, 1985). The exchange partner 
could defect to an alternative partner, for example, thus leading to termination of the relationship.  
 
Because benevolent buyers will always signal suppliers regarding their concern for the well-being of partners, the 
negative effects of monitoring will be lessened by this benevolence. On the other hand, if a buyer is not benevolent 
toward a supplier, then the negative effects of monitoring will worsen the relationship. The monitoring of suppliers 
establishes standards for quality, delivery, incentives, and other positive outcomes, as well as potentially enhancing 
a buyer's ability to detect and restrain a supplier from opportunism in the first place (Leenders & Fearon, 1993). 
Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: When a supplier trusts the benevolence of a buyer, the monitoring of a buyer over the supplier will enhance the 
performance of the supplier. 
 
Bilateral governance is based on the collective rather than the individual goals of two parties involved in an 
exchange relationship (Gundlach & Achrol, 1993). Bilateral governance relies on relational norms (Hur, Nam and 
Carvalho, 2014; Gundlach & Achrol, 1993; Weitz & Jap, 1995; Lusch & Brown, 1996), which stimulate efforts for 
mutual benefits between the buyer and the supplier (Kim & Cho, 2014; Weitz & Jap, 1995).  
 
Exchange parties relying on bilateral governance show high levels of flexibility in the relationship (Noordewier, 
John, and Nevin, 1990). The norm of flexibility is defined as the expectation that each party is willing to adapt to 
changing circumstances without resorting to renegotiation (Young, Sapienza and Baumer, 2003). The norm of 
flexibility implies that exchange parties are willing to modify the terms of exchange if a particular practice proves 
detrimental to either party (Heide & John, 1992). The norm of flexibility therefore contributes to the interfirm 
relationship by guiding the relationship in uncertain environments (Gundlach & Achrol, 1993). 
 
Relational norms, however, negatively influence the success of new products (Lee, Ha, and Kim, 2014; Ayers, 
Dahlstrom, and Skinner, 1997). The tendency to be flexible to the demands of colleagues by following the norm of 
flexibility may prevent people from expressing contingencies at odds with the opinions of presumed experts. 
Although these relational norms yield high levels of satisfaction, professional disagreements and disputes that are 
essential to product success may not be presented in the interest of maintaining flexibility (Ayers et al., 1997).  
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Exchange partners with too close of a relationship to one another often fail to produce optimum levels of 
performance (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Uzzi, 1996). This is mainly due to a lack of opportunity to access 
innovative information provided by non-close partners (Grabher, 1993). Relational norms tend to be vaguely 
defined, and thus they are broadly interpreted. Relational norms are vulnerable to manipulation by the more 
powerful party (Achrol & Gundlach, 1999). Overly close relationships increase organizational inertia and limit the 
openness of a relationship to information, to the extent that parties face difficulty in changing behaviors or finding 
alternative ways of doing things (Uzzi, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1995).  
 
The norm of flexibility also has a weak spot, which is the norm does not specify optimal behaviors in dealing with 
unique situations. Thus there might be disparity regarding the levels of flexibility a party expects from its partner. 
Exchange parties might have misunderstandings in certain situations, and might expect different types of behavior 
from partners (Young, Sapienza and Baumer, 2003). Ambiguous expectations and misunderstandings can undermine 
cooperation between exchange parties, thereby deteriorating interfirm performance (Weitz & Jap, 1995).  
 
Ambiguous expectations and misunderstandings might be mitigated by the existence of buyer benevolence, insofar 
as suppliers believe that benevolent buyers tend to behave for the benefit of the supplier. 
 
H2: When a supplier trusts the benevolence of a buyer, the reliance of bilateral governance will enhance the 
performance of the supplier. 
  
Plural Governance 
 
Plural governance refers to a buyer’s use of multiple types of governance in a relationship with a supplier. Due to 
the positive and negative effects of unilateral and bilateral governance, exchange parties must use plural governance 
to produce higher levels of performance (Weitz & Jap, 1995).  
 
An exchange party who wants to use plural governance should meet an important condition for producing positive 
performance. Namely, the plural governances should complement each other. Otherwise, conflict might exist 
between governances, thereby leading to low performance levels by one or both parties in the exchange relationship. 
For instance, the negative effects of monitoring are potentially mitigated by the norm of flexibility. Because 
exchange parties that engage in the norm of flexibility pursue collective goals, the negative effects of monitoring are 
alleviated by this tacit cooperation. Thus, the norm of flexibility complements monitoring as an example of 
advantageous plural governance. 
 
One question is whether a buyer that seeks to establish a norm of flexibility with its supplier needs to monitor the 
supplier. Because the norm of flexibility is not specific in terms of how to handle unique situations, exchange parties 
might not fully understand one another within all contexts (Weitz & Jap, 1995). A party that has obtained 
information by way of monitoring a partner will always have a chance to resolve issues quickly, thereby improving 
performance.  
 
The weakness of relational norms is that they are fragile and require continuous maintenance (Joshi & Stump, 1999). 
In contrast, comprehensive monitoring practices enhance channel performance by establishing clear expectations, 
providing immediate feedback and guiding modification (Bello & Gilliland, 1997). Monitoring therefore 
complements the norm of flexibility. 
 
Complementation between monitoring and relational norms enables buyers with high trust in suppliers the 
likelihood of enhancing the performance of suppliers. There are two reasons for this. First, because the norm of 
flexibility stresses a mutually beneficial relationship (Gundlach & Achrol, 1993), flexibility tends to establish an 
environment in which suppliers positively interpret any monitoring conducted by buyers. Buyer monitoring 
therefore signals suppliers about the importance of being monitored for the benefit of both parties (Sachdev, Bello, 
and Pilling, 1994). Accordingly, supplier perceptions of the significance of high performance and the achievement 
of mutual goals lead to enhanced levels of supplier performance. 
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The critical question for exchange partners is how to facilitate conditions under which plural governance is 
optimally complementary. Because a perceived lack of buyer benevolence on the part of a supplier will interfere 
with any voluntary adjustment from the supplier (Ganesan, 1994), the buyer is vulnerable to unforeseen 
circumstances such as a need to order more parts or cancel the order. Additionally, the negative feelings generated 
by monitoring in a partnership characterized by low benevolence prohibit suppliers from actively responding to 
buyer requests (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Accordingly, a party’s belief in the benevolence of its partner is a 
condition that should exist for effective plural governance.  
 
A party’s trust in the benevolence of its partner is a unilateral belief in the partner’s concern about the well-being of 
the trusting party. Thus, buyer benevolence represents an essential condition for a supplier to accept a buyer’s 
methods of governance. Accordingly, the use of plural control mechanisms will lead to improved supplier 
performance in relationships in which suppliers trust the benevolence of buyers.  
 
In contrast, in the absence of belief in a buyer’s benevolence, a supplier might be suspicious about a buyer’s 
methods of governance. A party with a low level of trust in its partner is less likely to find productive solutions to 
disagreements (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande, 1992), and less likely to adopt a cooperative approach to 
problem solving (Schurr & Ozanne, 1985). Therefore, a buyer using plural governance is less likely to enhance 
supplier performance when the supplier does not trust the buyer’s benevolence.  Thus the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: When a supplier trusts the benevolence of a buyer, the buyer’s use of plural governance (unilateral and 
bilateral) will enhance the performance of the supplier. 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized Model: 
Benevolence, Interfirm Governance, and Performance 
 
 
 
Note: The solid arrows are hypothesized to be significant relationships, whereas the dashed arrows are hypothesized to be non-significant 
relationships. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Setting and Data Collection 
 
This study considers the relationships between a buyer and its major supplier. We define the major supplier as the 
supplier accounting for the largest share of the manufacturer’s purchase of parts in the past year. The major 
supplier’s business partners are the firms with which the supplier has exchange relationships. For the methodology 
herein, the major supplier served as the referent for all the questions in the mail survey. We selected these 
relationships based on the theory that a manufacturer’s major supplier represents the most intense types of 
interaction between partners, as well as the greatest opportunities to develop interfirm governance.  
 
Supplier Performance 
 
Unilateral 
Governance 
Bilateral Governance 
 
Benevolence 
 
Bilateral x Unilateral 
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For this study’s sample, 850 manufacturers were selected randomly from a Dun and Bradstreet mailing list. We used 
standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 3011 to 3999, which is expected to have eliminated industry-specific 
influences on governance structure. 
 
As this research is concerned with the governance structures and benevolence of buyers in particular, the heads of 
purchasing departments of manufacturing companies were chosen as key informants. Purchasing managers are 
responsible for purchasing materials from suppliers. Therefore, purchasing managers are experts who are 
knowledgeable about buyer relationships with suppliers (Hutt & Speh, 1992).  
 
We mailed the questionnaire to each informant and instructed him or her to complete it with respect to the firm’s 
major supplier and its business partners. After callbacks and a second mailing, we collected a total of 195 responses 
(a 23% response rate). 
 
Non-Response Bias 
 
Corporate Affiliations Plus 2000 list was used for gathering secondary data on the characteristics of the companies 
for both responding and non-responding firms. We compared the demographic characteristics of these firms, 
including the location, firm size, number of employees, and total sales, but found no significant differences (e.g., p < 
.54 for the number of employees in both groups of firms). In addition, we measured the response rates and found no 
significant difference. These results demonstrate that the data was not skewed by a non-response bias.    
 
Measure Development 
 
We collected existing measures of the focal variables from previous research. Measure development was carried out 
in two stages. In the first stage, existing measures for our constructs were gathered from the literature. In the second 
stage, in-depth interviews were conducted with three purchasing managers. The purpose of these interviews was to 
check the relevance of the items developed in the first stage. Based on the input from the interviewed purchasing 
managers, the wording of some of the items was revised (see Table 2). All items used a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 
indicating “strongly disagree,” and 7 indicating “strongly agree.” 
 
We employed interfirm benevolence to measure a supplier’s unilateral belief about buyer concern for its well-being. 
The scale addresses buyer concerns about supplier interests, business growth, and business success (Ryu, Hung, and 
Mana, 2014). Secondly, the items that were designed to measure unilateral governance were used in the assessment 
of the manufacturer’s unilateral control over its supplier’s level of inventory and its quality control procedures, as 
well as the performance review of the supplier (Noordewier et al., 1990). Thirdly, the items designed for bilateral 
governance were used to measure the extent to which each party would be willing to adapt to changing 
circumstances without resorting to renegotiation (Min, Kwak, and Lee, 2015). 
 
We measured plural governance by multiplying the prevalence of bilateral governance with unilateral governance. 
Finally, supplier performance was measured according to buyer satisfaction with the supplier in terms of delivery 
time, the percentage of defective parts, the provision of information, and overall satisfaction (Noordewier, John and 
Nevin, 1990) (See Table 1).  
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Table 1. Measurement Items and Validity Assessment 
Model:  2 = 78.25, df = 59, p = .033; GFI = .92; CFI = .95; IFI = .95; RMSEA = .057 
Trust Reliability =.88 
1.  When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned about our welfare. .81 
2.  When it comes to things that are important to us, we can depend on the supplier’s support. .73 
3.  We can count on the supplier to consider how its decisions and actions will affect us. .77 
4.  Our firm can count on the supplier to be sincere. .83 
Monitoring Reliability = .75 
Our firm monitors the inventory levels of our major supplier.  .75 
The production processes of our major supplier are to a large extent determined by our firm’s 
requirements. 
.58 
We regularly conduct performance reviews of our major supplier. .77 
Any engineering changes by our major supplier are to a large extent determined by our firm’s 
requirements. 
* 
Bilateral Governance Reliability = .80 
Both our firm and our major supplier expect that each company will be flexible regarding the other 
company’s request for changes.  
.72 
Both our firm and our major supplier expect to be able to make any adjustments necessary to cope with 
changing circumstances.  
.83 
Both our firm and our major supplier expect to be flexible with each other if flexibility helps the other 
company. 
.62 
Supplier Performance Reliability = .78 
Your firm is satisfied with the service quality of the major supplier. 5 .72 
Your firm is satisfied with the overall performance of the major supplier. 5 .68 
Your firm is satisfied with the on-time delivery performance of the major supplier.  6 .70 
Note: SFL = standardized factor loading 
 
Construct Validity  
 
We conducted a scale development procedure for each variable. First, exploratory factor analyses were run for each 
set of constructs. We assessed the validity of the constructs, including benevolence, unilateral governance, bilateral 
governance, and supplier performance. We conducted an item-total correlation test to exclude any ill-fitting items. 
We then subjected the remaining items to a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using LISREL. Subsequently, 
reliability analyses were run for each construct to determine whether all the measures showed satisfactory reliability.  
 
After the scale purification process, a measurement model with acceptable fit indices was identified (χ2 = 78.25, df = 
59, p = .033; GFI = .92; CFI = .95; IFI = .95; RMSEA = .057). The  multiple correlation of each item was between 
.41 and .58, which indicates convergent validity (Bollen, 1989). All the factor loadings were highly significant (p < 
.01), which shows convergent validity and unidimensionality of the measures (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). 
Subsequently, reliability tests were conducted for each construct to determine whether all the measures 
demonstrated satisfactory coefficient reliability. The reliability of all the constructs was above .70 (Peter, 1979). 
Thus, these measures demonstrate adequate convergent validity and reliability.  
 
We evaluated the discriminant validity of all four of the latent variables through χ2 difference tests. We tested all 
constructs in pairs (a total of six tests) to determine whether the results of the restricted model (whose correlations 
were fixed as one) were significantly worse than the results of the freely estimated model (whose correlations were 
freely estimated). All χ2 differences were highly significant, indicating sufficient discriminant validity (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988). For example, the χ2 difference between unilateral and bilateral governance was χ2(1) = 24.25 (p < 
.01), indicating that these two constructs were sufficiently distinct from one another. The results of CFA, including 
the goodness-of-fit index, factor loadings, and reliability, are reported in Table 1.          
 
Because the value for plural governance was calculated as an interaction between unilateral and bilateral 
governance, the existence of multicollinearity between the interaction variables was possible (Jaccard & Wan, 
1995). To eliminate potential problems associated with multicollinearity, we mean-centered the variables of 
monitoring and the norm of information sharing (Aiken & West, 1991). The mean-centered variables were 
multiplied to establish the plural control mechanisms. The mean-centered variables of monitoring and the norm of 
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flexibility were also used for hypotheses testing.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Trust 1.00    
2. Bilateral Governance  .11 1.00   
3. Unilateral Governance  -.10 -.23 1.00  
4. Performance .18 .04 -.06 1.00 
Mean 5.16 4.48 3.53 4.98 
Standard Deviation 1.17 1.05 1.00 1.25 
Note: sample size = 172 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 
We employed structural models to test the hypotheses. The factors of the four constructs were used to test the 
hypotheses. We used bilateral governance and unilateral governance as an exogenous variable, benevolence as a 
moderating variable, and supplier performance as an endogenous variable.  
 
The findings are presented in Table 3. Hierarchical moderated regression was conducted to test the interaction 
effects of bilateral governance and benevolence (BILABENE: BILA × BENE) and (UNIBENE: UNILA × BENE) 
on supplier performance (PERFORM). To analyze the significance of the interaction effects, model 1, excluding the 
cross-product variable of BILABENE, was compared with model 2, using BILABENE and UNIBENE to determine 
whether the incremental R2 was significant (Anderson, 1985). 
 
To analyze the significance of the three-way interaction effects, model 2, including the cross-product variables of 
BILABENE and UNIBENE, was compared with the three- way interaction effects of bilateral governance, unilateral 
governance, and benevolence on supplier performance (BIUNIBENE: BILA × UNILA ×BENE). Model 2 was 
compared with model 3, using BI UNI BENE to determine whether the incremental R2 was significant. 
 
PERFORM  = b0 + b1BILA + b2UNILA + b3 BENE + b4 BILABENE 
+ b5 UNIBENE + b5 BIUNIBENE 
 
Table 3 shows that the R2 values for model 2 and for model 1 were .132 and .110, respectively, and that both were 
significant at < .05. The increment in R2 was .22, significant at < .05. This provides evidence that the significant 
amount of variance in supplier performance is explained by the existence of buyer benevolence.  
 
The result indicates that the interaction variable of unilateral governance and benevolence is significantly related to 
supplier performance (β = .175, p < .05), which supports hypothesis 1. The result also shows that the interaction 
variable of bilateral governance and benevolence is significantly related to supplier performance (β = .185, p < .05), 
which supports hypothesis 2. The variance inflation factor (VIF) values were well below the cutoff value of 10, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not present (Aiken and West, 1991). The three-way interaction variable of 
bilateral governance and unilateral governance and benevolence is also significantly related to supplier performance 
(β = .177, p < .05), which supports hypothesis 3. 
 
The effects of the control variable, relationship length, are not significantly related to supplier performance. 
Relationship length has a positive impact on supplier performance (see Table 3), but it is not significant. It appears 
that the length of the relationship between a buyer and its supplier is not important in increasing interfirm 
performance.  
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Table 3. Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis for Supplier Performance 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables (MONIT) Beta VIF 
Main Effects   
Unilateral -.122 (-1.17) 1.732 
Bilateral .099 (-0.84) 1.524 
Trust .315 ( 2.89)** 2.256 
Length .041 ( 0.38) 1.752 
Adj. R2 .110  
Interaction Effects   
Bilateral x Bene .185 (2.40)* 1.185 
Unilateral x Bene 
Cumulative Adj. R2 
.175 (2.28)* 
.132 1.362 
R2  Increment .022*  
Interaction Effects   
Bilateral x Unilateral x Bene .177 (2.37)* 1.117 
Cumulative Adj. R2 .152  
R2  Increment .020*  
Note: t-tests are two-tailed for hypothesized effects 
** p < .01  * p < .05 
VIF: collinearity statistic 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study shows that interfirm benevolence on the part of a buyer may increase interfirm performance in cases 
where the buyer uses unilateral and bilateral governance structures individually, as well as uses both governance 
structures simultaneously. Because both governance structures have weak spots, interfirm benevolence plays an 
important role in compensating for the weaknesses of the governance types and increasing interfirm performance. 
 
When a supplier feels the benevolence of its buyer, unilateral governance by the buyer positively affects the 
performance of the supplier. Some research shows a negative relationship between unilateral governance of a buyer 
and supplier performance (Uzzi, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Grabher, 1993; Ouchi, 1979). When a buyer 
unilaterally controls a supplier, such as managing the supplier’s inventory levels, the supplier’s autonomy is 
dishonored. The bad feelings engendered by this type of control may cause the supplier to resist the buyer’s 
governing attempts (Ouchi, 1979). The supplier may show a further lack of interest in meeting buyer expectations, 
which leads to poor supplier performance. 
 
Bilateral governance by a buyer also positively influences supplier performance when the supplier trusts the 
benevolence of the buyer. Previous research reports that an exchange party with a bilateral-based governance 
relationship often fails to produce optimum levels of performance due to a lack of access to innovative technology 
and information (Uzzi, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Grabher, 1993). The results of that study indicate that a 
buyer using bilateral governance must earn the belief of the supplier by way of buyer benevolence. Otherwise, the 
buyer may have difficultly increasing the performance of the supplier. 
 
Unilateral and bilateral governance structures show a complementary relationship when a supplier trusts the 
benevolence of the buyer. Individual governance has its own weak spots, so a buyer who needs to control a supplier 
may want to use multiple complementary governance structures. Our findings indicate that when a benevolent buyer 
uses both unilateral and bilateral governance structures simultaneously, suppliers perform positively.  
 
Managerial Implications 
 
This study guides firms toward producing better supplier performance. The essential implication of this study for 
practitioners is that exchange parties should develop benevolent relationships with exchange partners. When a party 
gives a partner reason to believe in its benevolent intentions, then the parties develop a better relationship, leading to 
superior performance. The results of this study imply that without a benevolent relationship, interfirm performance 
is not necessarily guaranteed. Firms should not take optimal performance levels for granted without developing 
benevolent relationships and governance mechanisms.   
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Another implication of this study is that a benevolent buyer should determine appropriate interfirm governance, 
accordingly. A buyer needs various governance structures to protect against a partner’s lack of interest in its welfare. 
This study implies that a buyer can rely on both unilateral governance and bilateral governance when a supplier 
believes in the buyer’s benevolence.  
 
The study indicates that a benevolent buyer’s reliance on multiple governance structures results in enhanced supplier 
performance. When a supplier trusts in the benevolence of its buyer, the complementary relationship between 
unilateral governance and bilateral governance plays an important role in increasing the quality of the supplier’s 
performance. Because reliance on unilateral governance potentially triggers negative reactions from suppliers, a 
buyer needs to develop and use bilateral governance. Therefore, benevolent buyers should simultaneously use both 
governance structures to enhance supplier performance. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study adopts monitoring as an example of unilateral governance, while other mechanisms of unilateral 
governance, such as vertical control, are alternative examples of unilateral governance. A buyer is able to control a 
supplier by compelling the supplier to accept the buyer’s requests, for example. This is a much more active form of 
unilateral governance than monitoring. Accordingly, the effects of buyer benevolence on a vertical control-based 
relationship and supplier performance might be different.     
 
The norm of flexibility is used to represent bilateral governance in this study. The norm of information sharing or 
the norm of conflict resolution are alternative aspects of bilateral governance. Because the norm of flexibility is just 
one of several governance mechanisms, the results about the effects of buyer benevolence on supplier performance 
may differ according to other governance mechanisms. Thus, future studies might try using other mechanisms of 
bilateral governance to obtain more robust results.  
 
In future studies, we may investigate the simultaneous use of multiple governance structures and their impact on 
firm performance in the context of other trust dimensions, such as honesty or credibility. Because honesty and 
credibility have been analyzed as critical dimensions of trust in previous literature, we focus only on interfirm 
benevolence. Further studies may include and utilize other trust dimensions in different combinations to evaluate 
their impact on interfirm performance. 
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